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"[T]he deep seas and ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all
human beings." ' These words spoken by President Lyndon Johnson in
1966 foreshadowed an international movement to protect the oceans.
Sixteen years later the movement culminated in a comprehensive Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea-a treaty grounded upon the principle
that oceans beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are the "common
heritage of mankind."'2
Despite nearly two decades of United States support for the "common
heritage" principle, and the efforts behind the Convention, the Reagan
Administration rejected the treaty in 1982.3 The following year the Pres-
ident initiated his unilateral ocean policy with a Proclamation and an
adjoining statement calling for the establishment of a 200-mile Exclu-
sive Economic Zone and reiterating his view that deep seabed mining is
a high seas freedom.4 Defending the rejection of the Convention, Rea-
gan's ambassador to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) declared: "[T]he political, economic and ideological as-
sumptions which underlay the treaty are essentially antithetical to
American values [and promote] a thinly disguised world collectivism."'5
* B.A., 1980, M.U.A., 1982, Wichita State University; J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School,
1985.
1. Remarks at the Commissioning of the Research Ship Oceanographer, 2 PUB. PAPERS
LYNDON B. JOHNSON 722, at 724 (July 13, 1966).
2. The phrase "the common heritage of mankind" was first applied to the oceans by
Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta, in his famous speech before the United Nations on Au-
gust 17, 1967. Alexander, Future Regimes: A Survey ofProposals, in III NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA 120 (R. Churchill, K.R. Simmonds, T. Welch eds. 1973).
3. Reagan announced his decision not to sign the treaty on July 9, 1982. President's
Statement on the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 887
(1982) [hereinafter Statement on the Law of the Sea].
4. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Federal Register, 10,605 (1983) [hereinafter Proclamation].
Statement by the President, March 10, 1983 [hereinafter Presidential Statement] (on file with
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW).
5. Remarks of James Malone, Assistant Secretary of State and the United States Repre-
sentative to UNCLOS under Reagan, quoted by Curtis, Sign the Sea-Law Treaty, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 21, 1983, at A17, col. 4. According to Curtis, Malone said:
Put directly, the principle objection [to the UNCLOS Convention] was that the polit-
ical, economic and ideological assumptions which underlay the treaty are essentially an-
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These comments are emblematic of the deeply imbedded philosophical
opposition to international regulation and control that prompted the
Reagan reaction. Such ideological rigidity justifies close scrutiny. As
Leigh Ratiner, an UNCLOS negotiator under Nixon, Ford and Reagan,
said, "the guardians of pure conservative ideology may have won a bat-
tle when the United States stood alone at the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion, but the United States may lose a very important war." 6
This Note discusses the political implications of U.S. opposition to the
Convention and critiques its legal support. An alternative response is
proposed which calls for adoption of a pragmatic and flexible approach
with particular emphasis on the long-term credibility of the United
States as a member of the world community.
I An Historical Overview
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was
convened in 1973. 7 These negotiations received continuous U.S. sup-
port throughout the Administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford and
Carter. By 1980, U.S. officials were predicting that a treaty effectively
protecting U.S. interests could soon be adopted.8
President Reagan's election, however, frustrated these predictions.
Fearing that his new Administration would be forced to vote on an un-
acceptable treaty, President Reagan took the unprecedented step of
withdrawing the United States from UNCLOS in March 1981 to allow
a thorough review of the Convention. 9 By January 29, 1982 the review
tithetical to American values. It is a document which, hiding behind the mask of
superficially appealing slogans like "new economic world order" and "the common heri-
tage of mankind," promotes a thinly disguised world collectivism. It is intended as an
instrument for the redistribution of the world's wealth-from those who have acquired
their prosperity by risk, sacrifice, and hard work, to those who seek their prosperity
through organizational means. It reflects the unrealistic dreams-long nurtured by ear-
nest persons and organizations-for the advancement of less-developed nations.
6. Statement by Leigh Ratiner to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(May 25, 1982), reprinted in 62 CONG. DIG. 22, 26 (1983).
7. The U.N. had sponsored two previous conferences on the law of the sea. The first was
held in 1958, adopting four treaties: the Convention on the Continental Shelf; the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone; the High Seas; and Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas. The second conference, held in 1960, failed to accomplish its goal of
determining the width of the territorial sea. The 1958 treaties can be found in C. FRANKLIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1959-1960, THE LAW OF THE SEA: SOME RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS (Vol. 53, Naval War College Blue Book Series).
8. Van Dyke & Yuen, "Common Heritage" and "Freedom of the High Seas', Whzh Governs the
Seabed?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493, 527 (1982). See also statement of Elliot Richardson, U.S.
Representative to UNCLOS under Carter, quoted in The Wichita Eagle and Beacon, Aug. 30,
1980, at 1 ("It is now all but certain that the text of a Convention on the Law of the Sea will
be ready for signature in 1981.").
9. Wertenbaker, A Reporter at Large. The Law of the Sea, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 1, 1983,
at 42-44. Wertenbaker points out that withdrawal from negotiations was unnecessary. Al-
Vol. 2:127, 1983
Law of the Sea
had been completed, and the President announced that the U.S. was
ready to return to negotiations.' 0
The Reagan Administration response to the treaty draft, presented in
a 68-page booklet on March 19, suggested amendments to more than
half of the seabed provisions. The proposed changes were so radical
they were generally ignored.'" The U.S. finally introduced a stream-
lined 24-page set of formal amendments one month before the negotiat-
ing sessions were to end. By that time, however, the negotiations were
effectively over. 12 Nations which had previously joined the U.S. in op-
position to various provisions of the treaty could not support Reagan's
actions. The U.S. became isolated in its intransigence. 13 The Reagan
Administration's announced opposition to significant portions of the
Convention that had been proposed or supported by prior U.S. negotia-
tors demonstrated a fundamental shift in philosophical orientation.' 4 A
U.S. rejection of the Convention as a whole seemed inevitable. Under
these conditions, further U.S. negotiating efforts were futile.
though the Conference was coming to a close, the U.S. could have obtained a continuance in
the negotiations to delay final consideration of the Convention, while Reagan was reviewing
his law of the sea policy. The U.S. had done just this in previous presidential transitions. The
decision to withdraw was a surprise to most other nations as well as to the U.S. negotiating
team.
10. Presidential Statement on United States Participation in the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1 PuB. PAPERS RONALD REAGAN 92 (Jan. 29, 1982).
11. Whitaker, Outside the Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC, Oct 1982, at 21.
12. Id The Reagan Administration's inability to effect the negotiations may have been
more from design than lack of planning. According to Whitaker, "[k]nowledgeable observers
speculate . . . that hard-liners in the administration didn't want the concessions that the
Third World was willing to give, because such improvement would strengthen the treaty's
attractions for the Europeans."
13. Wertenbaker, supra note 9, at 45.
14. See Jacobson, Sea Changes (Book Review), 91 YALE L. J. 842, 848 (1982), citing A.
HOLLICK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 356 (1981). In her
detailed history of the U.S. involvement in the UNCLOS negotiations, Hollick described the
concessions presented to the Conference in 1976 by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
The U.S. was seeking to reach a compromise with the Third World, especially with regard to
navigation rights. Hollick summarized Kissinger's proposals:
The first concern was that an international Enterprise would be given the right to
mine the seabed under equal conditions. The second was that each prospective miner
was to propose two sites to the [International Seabed Authority], one of which could be
reserved for mining by the Enterprise or by developing countries. In addition, revenues
would be generated for the poorest countries based either on royalties or on a system of
profit sharing. [Further], Kissinger proposed that incentives should be established for
private companies to share technology with and train personnel from developing coun-
tries that mined the seabed. . . . He [also] indicated U.S. willingness to agree to a
means of financing the Enterprise so that it could begin mining concurrently with states.
And, as a further inducement, he proposed periodic review conferences where the mining
system might be reexamined. A final area in which Kissinger made new proposals was
on limiting production of seabed minerals.
See also Wertenbaker, supra note 9, at 60; infta note 126 and accompanying text (outlining the
Reagan objections to the Convention, most of which concerned provisions similar to the Kis-
singer proposals).
129
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On April 30, 1982 UNCLOS member nations adopted the Conven-
tion by a vote of 130-4, with 17 abstentions. 15 Breaking from the tradi-
tional reliance in the Conference on consensus in decision-making, the
U.S. asked for a recorded vote. Subsequently, it voted "no," along with
Israel, Venezuela and Turkey.16 When the Convention was opened for
signature on December 10, 117 nations signed on the first day - a rec-
ord number, according to the General Counsel to the U.N., 17 and a level
of support unexpected by the Reagan Administration.' 8
The Convention on the Law of the Sea contains 17 main parts and
320 articles, covering virtually all aspects of ocean use.' 9 Under the
treaty, coastal states may exercise sovereign control over a territorial sea of
up to 12 miles, while being required to guarantee foreign vessels "inno-
cent passage." In addition, coastal states acquire jurisdiction over the
natural resources of the continental shelf out to 350 miles, or over a 200-
mile exclusi've economic zone (EEZ). The rights of other states to navigate,
overfly, and lay submarine cables and pipes are preserved.
In the area beyond national jurisdiction, the Convention protects all
traditional high seas freedoms, including the right to fish and conduct
scientific research, not preserved within the EEZ. Land-locked states
are granted the right of access to and from the sea. Moreover, "transit
passage" through international straits is guaranteed to all states.
Expansion of the territorial sea, creation of the EEZ, and protection
of high seas freedoms, including navigation rights, are generally not con-
troversial.2 0 U.S. opposition to the Convention focuses on the regulation
15. U.N. CHRONICLE, June 1982, at 3. As of November 1983, there were 131 signatories
to the Convention and 9 ratifications. The Convention will enter into force 12 months after
ratification by the 60th nation. Kimball, PrepCom Concludes First Session, 8 SOUNDINGS 2 (Nov.
1982).
16. U.N. CHRONICLE, June 1982, at 3. Venezuela and Turkey have since withdrawn
their rejection of the Convention. MacRae, Customa y International Law and the United Nations'
Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 181, 181 (1983).
17. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1982, at 6, col. 4.
18. Fiji became the first nation to ratify the treaty when it presented the necessary ratifi-
cation documents on the day the Convention opened for signatures. Its representative stated:
The world is ready to show we can do without the overbearing attitudes of the super-
powers. In April, when we adopted the treaty, we didn't think we could get fifty signa-
tures. This is a big blow to the U.S. position.
Id at 1, col. 1.
19. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/122
(1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS Convention]. All later references to the UNCLOS Conventon
that are not specifically cited refer to this document.
20. Statement on the Law of the Sea, supra note 3, at 92 ("We have now completed a
review of that Convention and recognize that it contains many positive and very significant
accomplishments. Those extensive parts dealing with navigation and overflight and most
other provisions of the Convention are consistent with U.S. interests and, in our view, serve
well the interests of all nations.").
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and use of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction. 2 I All activities
in this area are to be regulated by the International Sea-Bed Authority
(ISA), empowered to grant mining rights to both public and private
ventures. An organization called the Enterprise will operate a "parallel
system" for exploring and exploiting the ocean resources. Because the
seabed is recognized as a "common heritage," all mining operators will
be expected to contribute a portion of their revenues to the ISA. This is
in addition to revenues expected from the states for resource develop-
ment beyond 200 miles but within the continental shelf, and thus under
national jurisdiction. To ensure international access to ocean resources,
the Convention further requires mining contractors to sell to the ISA
technology that cannot be obtained on the open market. The regula-
tions for mining the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, and the
procedures under which the Authority and the Enterprise will operate,
are left to be developed by a Preparatory Commission (PrepCom).22 Al-
though the U.S., despite its opposition to the treaty, is entitled to
become involved in the PrepCom negotiations, the Reagan Administra-
tion has refused to participate. 23
The broad range of responsibilities placed on the PrepCom provides
an opportunity to strengthen the Convention.2 4 A study of the role of
the PrepCom by the Citizens for Ocean Law concluded that most of the
objections to the treaty could be met if only the Reagan Administration
would take advantage of its opportunity to negotiate. 25 At the very ear-
liest, several years will be required to complete the Commission's work,26
21. Id ("Our review recognizes... that the deep seabed mining part of the Convention
does not meet U.S. objectives. For this reason, I am announcing today that the U.S. will not
sign the Convention as adopted at the conference.").
22. Citizens for Ocean Law, U.S. Options on the Law of the Sea: The Preparatory Com-
mission 1 (Dec. 1, 1982) [hereinafter U.S. Options] (on file with YALE LAW & POLICY
REVIEW).
23. Id
24. Citizens for Ocean Law, Recent Events in the Law of the Sea 2 (Spring/Summer
1982) [hereinafter Spring/Summer Recent Events]. The first meeting of the PrepCom was
held on March 15 - April 8, 1983, during which six topics were identified as areas for future
sessions to consider:
The rules, regulations and procedures on administrative, financial and budgetary mat-
ters of the Authority;
Measures necessary for the Enterprise to begin early and effective operations;
Problems of land-based developing nation producers of seabed minerals;
Rules, regulations and procedures for the exploration and exploitation of the seabed;
Implementation of Resolution II on pioneer investors (PIP); and
Arrangements for the establishment of the International Tribunal on the Law of the
Sea.
25. U.S. Options, supra note 22, at 3 ("[A]n examination of the criticisms set forth by the
President reveals all but one of these [the review conference] could be significantly addressed
within the mandate of the PrepCom without actually changing the language of the treaty
itself.").
26. Id
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especially considering the depressed mineral demand reducing the ur-
gency of the task.2 7 Therefore, it is not too late for U.S. participation.
Additionally, the rules drafted in the PrepCom-which are "likely to
govern deep seabed mining for the first generation of these activities"-
may be altered only "by consensus in the 36-member executive Council
of the International Seabed Authority. ' 28 If the U.S. took its guaran-
teed seat on the Council, its interests could be secure.29
II Poicy Options
The United States can respond to the UNCLOS Convention in a va-
riety of ways. The main options include:
1. Signing the Convention as it is currently drafted;
2. Directly opposing the Convention, and pursuing unilateral ocean pol-
icy through
a) national legislation, and
b) private contractual arrangements; or
3. Working to improve the Convention before signing, while demonstrat-
ing good faith support for its principles.
Each alternative is described below, followed by a discussion of the
corresponding policy implications.
A. Signing the Treaty
Although Reagan has rejected the Convention, the United States re-
tains the option to sign it at any time. Support for the Convention
comes from two perspectives: those who view it as an effective compro-
mise enhancing United States interests; and those who see it as the least
harmful option. The first view is articulated by Elliot Richardson, the
U.S. negotiator under Carter, who stated that as a result of "fair and
workable compromises," the Conference had been "an unprecedented
achievement for multilateral negotiations" and had developed a treaty
that "the deep seabed mining industry and American industry in gen-
eral should wish to see ratified. ' 30 The second approach is propounded
by Leigh Ratiner, who maintains that the United States should sign the
treaty-even though it is flawed-since the United States could other-
wise "suffer a significant, long-term foreign policy setback with grave
implications for United States influence in global economic and political
27. Spring/Summer Recent Events, supra note 24, at 2.
28. U.S. Options, supra note 22, at 4.
29. For discussion of the U.S. seat on the Council, see infra notes 132-134 and accompany-
ing text.
30. Address by Elliot Richardson before the American Mining Congress (Sept. 24, 1980),
reprinted in DEPT. ST. BULL., Dec. 1980, at 60.
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affairs." 3
Both positions share the view that the treaty represents a "package
deal" in which the United States has compromised in some areas (such
as mining) so as to gain in others (such as navigation rights).
B. Unilateral ocean policy
A unilateral ocean policy consisting of domestic legislation and mul-
tinational agreements has been the chosen policy of the Reagan Admin-
istration. These two components are integrally linked since the latter is
necessary for the former to be effective.
(1) Domestic Legislation
Legislation aimed at implementing the President's Proclamation was
introduced by Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) and Representative John
Breaux (D-La). The Stevens/Breaux bill continues to represent the ba-
sic policy of the Reagan Administration on the law of the sea. 32
The bill amends the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 33 to define
the outer boundary of the continental shelf and establish the EEZ.3 4 On
the whole, these changes are not controversial.3 5
31. Ratiner, supra note 6, at 24. Ratiner is an especially good source for defense of the
treaty since he is a conservative and, while a lobbyist for a mining company, "[was] called the
single most effective influence in arousing Congressional hostility to the Law of the Sea
treaty." Wertenbaker, supra note 9, at 45. Thus, it is difficult for conservative opponents of
the Convention to attack Ratiner's politics.
32. The bills are labelled S. 750 (introduced March 10) and H.R. 2061 (introduced
March 11) (on file with YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW). They will be the model for the
discussion of the President's proposed option. In general, the legislation will not be specifi-
cally cited to when referring to various provisions.
Serious consideration of the Stevens/Breaux bill has for the time being been preempted by
Congressional study of the possible creation of a National Oceans Policy Commission
(NOPC). Supported by both sympathizers with and critics of the Convention, the NOPC
would evaluate and assess U.S. ocean policy in light of President Reagan's decision to not
participate in UNCLOS. The Reagan Administration seeks rapid adoption of the NOPC as
a means of spurring action on the Stevens/Breaux bill. Paterson & Kimball, US Congress
Looks at Oceans, 8 SOUNDINGS 3 (Nov. 1983).
33. 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 et. seq. (Supp. V 1981).
34. The proposed bill generally conforms to Artocle 76 of the UNCLOS Convention in its
definition of the outer boundary of the continental shelf, although the bill does not specify a
maximum limit of 350 nautical miles as does Article 76(6). The bill's description of the outer
boundary of the EEZ is virtually identical to that specified in Article 57 of the Convention.
35. Although the U.S. jurisdictional claims to the EEZ (listed in Title 1, Sec. 101 of the
bill) in general conform to Article 56 of the Convention, there are some key differences. The
bill includes marine scientific research as a "high seas freedom," open to other nations in the
superjacent waters of the EEZ. In contrast, Article 56(6) of the Convention lists such research
as one of the areas in the EEZ subject to national jurisdiction. In addition, the bill excludes
"highly migratory" species of fish, defined in Sec. 102 of Title 1 as species of tuna (which
cycle, spawn and migrate over long distances) from exclusive national jurisdiction. This is
consistent with the Presidential Statement, supra note 4, which emphasizes the U.S. policy
that highly migratory species of tuna are not subject to national control. The Convention, on
the other hand, does not exclude such species of fish from coastal jurisdiction in Article 56,
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More importantly, the legislation amends the Deep Seabed Hard
Minerals Resources Act (Mining Act). 36 Under the current law only
ocean nodules lying on or just below the surface can be mined. The bill
deletes the depth restrictions and increase the variety of minerals open
to exploitation.
3 7
In addition, any language supporting the UNCLOS Convention or
the "common heritage" principle is removed from the Mining Act. The
current law refers to the UNCLOS negotiations throughout its findings
and purposes,38 and acknowledges the deep seabed as a "common heri-
tage." The law also states that it is in the national interest to develop "a
new legal order for the oceans covering a broad range of ocean interests,
including exploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral re-
sources of the deep seabed."' 39 This express support for a "new legal or-
der" is deleted by the proposed legislation, which calls instead for "an
international agreement" to assure development of ocean resource "for
the benefit of mankind."
Furthermore, instead of encouraging the Secretary of State to "nego-
tiate successfully" a comprehensive treaty to give "legal definition" to
the "common heritage," 4 the Stevens/Breaux proposal merely calls for
"international agreements" that can "assure the development of mineral
resources." Whereas the original language implies a common property
but instead maintains, in Article 64, that there should be international cooperation and man-
agement of fish. Most coastal states interpret the Convention as granting exclusive rights over
highly migratory species within the fishery zones of each nation. See, e.g., Extract from Com-
munique of Thirteenth South Pacific Forum (Aug. 9-10) (on file with the YALE LAW & POL-
Icy REVIEW). The bill also conflicts with the Convention with regard to foreign allocations of
excess fishery resources, by giving the Secretary of State greater discretion to refuse such allo-
cations.
For discussion of possible problems with and conflicts resulting from the Presidential Proc-
lamation, supra note 4, see Pierce, Selective 4doption of the New Law of the Sea: The United States
Proclaims its Exclusive Economic Zone, 23 VA. J. INT'L. L. 581 (1983). For a detailed discussion of
the Stevens/Breaux bill and its effects on domestic and foreign policy, see Hufford, A Legal
Analysis of the "Exclusive Economic Zone Implementation Act" Uan. 1984) (on file with
Yale Legislative Services).
36. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1401 et. seq. (Supp. V 1981).
37. The current Act limits the depth of exploitation to 10 meters. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1403 (4)
(Supp. V 1981) This is deleted from the Act by Section 202(11) of the Stevens/Breaux bill. In
addition, in Section 202(b)(12) the bill expands the definition of minerals which can be ex-
ploited to include "oil, gas, sulphur, geopressured - geothermal and associated resources, and
all other minerals which are authorized by an Act of Congress." This contrasts with the
current Act's definition of "hard mineral resources" as including "any deposit or accretion on,
or just below, the surface of the deep seabed of nodules which include one or more minerals,
at least one of which contains manganese, nickel, cobalt or copper." 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1403(6)
(Supp. V 1981).
38. For those subsections in which the UNCLOS negotiations are referred to directly, see
30 U.S.C. Sec. 1401 (a)(7)-(9), (10), (14), (16), (b)(l)-(3) (Supp. V 1981).
39. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1401 (a)(8) (Supp. V 1981).
40. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1401 (b)(l) (Supp. V 1981).
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interest in the oceans, the proposed amendments encourage resource de-
velopment that generally benefits the world through economic growth,
without granting any "right" to the resources or recognizing eventual
international regulation. While the present law limits its function to
"interim" legislation, preempted once an international treaty is ap-
proved, 4 1 the proposed changes place the national program as para-
mount, accepting international agreements only to the extent they
advance the national plan.
The bill also abolishes an international trust fund established in the
Mining Act through a 3.75% tax on the imputed value of seabed re-
sources removed by mining companies.4 2 The current law targets the
fund for use under any international treaty to which the United States
might become party. This fund was set up to "bolster the principles of
the 'common heritage of mankind'," and was considered large enough
to "demonstrate the United States' commitment to this principle. '43 In
contrast, the Stevens/Breaux bill maintains the trust fund only for use
in national marine environmental protection programs. This clear
divergence from the goals enunciated in the Mining Act's legislative his-
tory44 emphasizes the current Administration's antipathy toward inter-
national involvement in the exploitation of ocean resources.
(2) Reciprocal Agreements
Before investing in ocean mining projects or obtaining financing for
exploration, mining companies require assurances that their investments
will be secure. 45 The Reagan Administration has initiated efforts to ne-
gotiate multilateral treaties that would recognize mine sites on a recipro-
cal basis with other industrialized nations to obtain that security. An
interim Agreement was concluded by the United States on September 2,
1982, with France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United
Kingdom, in which parties agreed to consult on overlapping seabed
mine-site claims. 46
41. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1401 (b)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
42. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1472 (a) (Supp. V 1981).
43. Letter from Henry C. Stockwell, Deputy General Counsel for the Department of
Treasury, to Morris K. Udall, Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs (April
30, 1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1648, 1648-9.
44. Id See H.R. REP. No. 411 pt. 2, 96th Cong, 2d Sess, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1649-50 (discussing in detail the purposes of the 1980 law).
45. See binfa notes 79, 80, 161, 162 and accompanying text.
46. Citizens for Ocean Law, Recent Events in the Law of the Sea (Oct. 15, 1982) [herein-
after Oct. Recent Events] (on file with the YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW). The Agreement is
entitled, "Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of
the Deep Sea Bed."
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Responding to criticism, 4 7 the Federal Republic of Germany at-
tempted to reconcile the Agreement with the Convention by emphasiz-
ing that it was merely a consultation mechanism to encourage dispute
settlements when necessary, and did not call for reciprocal recognition
of claims. 48 The United States, however, has not even attempted recon-
ciliation. Instead, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Theodore
Kronmiller lauded the Agreement as a potential "first step" in creating
an alternative to the Convention.49
Whether the Agreement will serve as a "first step" toward developing
a mini-treaty outside the Convention depends on the success of United
States efforts to persuade its allies to reject the Convention. Thus far, all
mining states except the United States are maintaining their option to
sign the treaty, 50 and are taking actions that will allow them to proceed
under the Convention if, and when, it goes into effect.5 1
C. A Compromzse-Phzilosophical Support
A compromise alternative, and this Note argues a superior one, is to
retain the portions of the Reagan strategy in accord with the Conven-
tion and international law, such as the EEZ, but to refrain from enact-
ing legislation that explicitly violates the treaty provisions. In addition,
the U.S. should continue to recognize the Convention's principles, while
endeavoring to secure its own interests through participation in the
PrepCom and in collateral negotiations.
In reviewing the efforts of the Administration, Ambassador Ratiner
concludes that "had the [Reagan] Administration been less ideologically
rigid in its approach," the treaty "would have better satisfied United
States' interests. ' 52 Ambassador Richardson adds that "significant ad-
ditional concessions" might have been gained from the Third World if
the U.S. had sincerely sought an acceptable treaty.53 Because of his out-
spoken conservatism, combined with the desire of other nations to com-
plete the Convention, Reagan was probably in the best position of any
American President to achieve major gains. This advantage could yet
47. In a statement endorsed by the Soviet Bloc, the Group of 77 (the developing nations)
responded to the Agreement at a September meeting of UNCLOS. They claimed that any
unilateral or multilateral action on seabed resources "would have no international validity
and would lead to the adoption of appropriate measures to defend the interests of all States."
Id See also U.N. CHRONICLE, Nov. 1982, at 27.
48. Id
49. Id
50. See rTfra note 167 and accompanying text.
51. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
52. Ratiner, supra note 6, at 26.
53. Address by Elliot Richardson before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries (July 26, 1982), reprinted in 62 CONG. DIG. 18, 18 (1983). See also address by Senator
Claiborne Pell before the U.S. Senate (May 6, 1982), reprinted in 62 CONG. DIG. 10, 12 (1983).
136
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be regained through active involvement in the UNCLOS process-an
option that will be developed further in Parts III and IV of this
discussion.
11 A Legal and Poh'ti*al Analysts
The policy options available to the U.S. for responding to the Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea should be assessed on the degree to which
each alternative:
1. Conforms to principles of international law;
2. Provides incentives for U.S. mining companies;
3. Incurs risks of retaliation on other issues; and
4. Enhances or detracts from long-term international stature.
These considerations provide the best means for analyzing the appro-
priateness of U.S. ocean law policy and tailoring an American response
to the Convention.
A. International Legahtj
A major legal question raised by the debate over the law of the sea is
whether a nation can legally mine the deep seabed without interna-
tional approval. In analyzing this question, this Note first reviews the
various theories justifying the legality of unilateral mining and then con-
siders whether the deep seabed has become subject to international reg-
ulation through the development of the "common heritage" as a
customary rule.
(1) The Defense of Unilateral Mtning
Three theories have been advanced to defend unilateral mining.
Each one suffers from inadequate legal support.
Res Nulius and the right to exclusi've claims
Some proponents of unilateral mining contend that the deep seabed is
a res nullius, "open to exploitation and exclusive claims by the first occu-
pant. 's5 That which is res nulius is subject to control of the first occu-
pier; that which is res communis cannot be claimed. 55
The res nullius theory was first proposed in the 1940's to justify na-
tional claims over the resources of the continental shelf. These claims
were recognized under international law on other grounds, however.
54. See Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 514, 518 (discussing Kronmiller, Ely and Gol-
die). According to Van Dyke and Yuen, Kronmiller justifies deep seabed mining under either
high seas freedom or res nulzus; Ely and Goldie claim that nodules are res nullius.
55. Id. at 515.
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The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf granted coastal States
sovereign rights over the resources of their shelves, but explicitly stated
that these rights did "not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or
on any express proclamation. ' 56 Furthermore, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) held in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases that the right
of a coastal State over its continental shelf was an "inherent right,"
based on the "natural prolongation of its land territory into and under
the sea," and was not a right which could be lost by foreign occupa-
tion.57 Without the continental shelf examples, few supporting prece-
dents remain, and numerous contrary examples deny the right to make
exclusive claims to the seabed.58
In 1970 the U.N. voted unanimously that the seabed was not subject
to national claims, 59 and this became a universally accepted provision
in the UNCLOS Convention. 60 All nations, the U.S. among them, have
endorsed this conclusion. 6' When Deepseas Ventures, a U.S. corpora-
tion, filed a claim in 1974 with the Department of State for exclusive
rights to a 60,000 square mile area of the deep seabed, there was a rapid
and unanimous rejection from the international community. 62 Today it
56. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Art. 2(3), reprinted in FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at
221.
57. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,
19 [hereinafter North Sea Cases].
58. The sources defending the applicability of res nulins rely either on examples of claims
in the continental shelf, such claims no longer being defensible, see supra notes 56 and 57 and
accompanying text, or on the analogy of the seabed to unclaimed land, which is unconvincing
since the seabed cannot be inhabited in the same manner that land can be. Furthermore, the
rejection of claims to Antarctica and outer space demonstrate the international community's
rejection of res nulh'us. Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 517-9.
59. On December 17, 1970, the U.N. unanimously passed the "Declaration of Principles
Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction" [hereinafter Declaration of Principles]. Clause 2 of the Declaration
states:
The area [beyond national jurisdiction] shall not be subject to appropriation by any
means by States or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise
sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof.
Declaration of Principles reprintedin II NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 740 (S.H.
Lay, R. Chruchill, M. Nordquist eds. 1973) [hereinafter New Directions II]. The vote on the
Declaration was 108 - 0, with 14 Eastern European abstentions. The Soviet bloc has since
endorsed it.
60. UNCLOS Convention, Art. 137(1), supra note 19 ("No State shall claim or exercise
sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area [the deep seabed beyond national
jurisdiction] or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any
part thereof.").
61. Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 519 ("Since 1967, the international community,
including the United States, has emphatically rejected the proposition that the deep seabed is
a res nulhus.") The rejection of sovereign claims is recognized by the U.S. in the Mining Act,
supra note 36, and the Stevens/Breaux bill, supra note 32, both of which deny making any
sovereign claims to the seabed.
62. McDOUGAL & REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
441 (1981). The U.S. State Department issued a statement declaring: "The Department of
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is generally accepted that res nulus is inapplicable to the deep seabed.63
Even the Reagan Administration has implicitly denied the validity of
exclusive claims. 64
Ocean mining as a high seas freedom
The U.S. currently maintains that deep seabed mining is a high seas
freedom any nation may exercise so long as it does not interfere with the
high seas freedom of other nations.65 The 1958 Geneva Convention on
the High Seas enumerated such freedom to include: (1) freedom of nav-
igation, (2) freedom of fishing, (3) freedom to lay submarine cables and
pipes, (4) freedom to fly over the high seas, and "other [freedoms] which
are recognized by the general principles of international law."'66 Be-
cause the Convention neither specifically included nor excluded deep
seabed mining, the United States and some authorities maintain that
mining falls under the residual category of "other freedoms. ' '6 7
This position is based on language in the 1955 Commentaries of the
International Law Commission (ILC) to drafts of the Geneva conven-
tion,68 which seems to support the U.S. position:
The list of freedoms of the high seas contained in this article is not restric-
tive; the Commission has merely specified four of the main freedoms. It is
aware that there are other freedoms, such as freedom to explore or exploit
the subsoil of the high seas and freedom to engage in scientific research
therein .... 69
A year later, however, the ILC changed its interpretation. In its de-
finitive 1956 report to the General Assembly the ILC stated, "[a]ny free-
dom that is to be exercised in the interest of all entitled to enjoy it, must
be regulated .... -70 But it added:
The Commission has not made specific mention of the freedom to explore
State does not grant or recognize exclusive mining rights to the mineral resources of an area
beyond national jurisdiction."
63. Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 518 ("Because the continental shelf did not be-
come a res nullius zone, virtually no authority supports the proposition that the deep seabed
should be considered as such a zone.").
64. See Presidential Statement, supra note 4 (referring to deep seabed mining as "a lawful
exercise of the freedom of the high seas open to all nations.") (emphasis added).
65. Id
66. Convention on the High Seas, reprtted in FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 203.
67. According to Van Dyke and Yuen, this language is the "key" to arguments made by
most supporters of unilateral ocean mining, including Kronmiller, Burgon, Ely, former Con-
gressman John Murphy, and the U.S. Department of State, all who defend mining as a "high
seas freedom." Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 502.
68. Id at 501, n. 28. The U.N. established the ILC as an advisory body to promote the
progressive development and codification of international law. The ILC prepared draft arti-
cles for the 1958 Conference to help explain the meaning of the Conventions.
69. [1955] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 21-2, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A.
70. [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 278, U.N. Doc. A/3159, quoted in Biggs, Deep Seabed
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or exploit the subsoil of the high seas. It considered that apart from the
case of the exploitation or exploration of the soil or subsoil of a continental
shelf, . . . such exploitation had not yet assumed sufficient practical im-
portance to justify special regulation.71
In this final report the ILC made no attempt to evaluate mining. In-
stead it left the determination for the future, implying that while mining
was not prohibited or controlled by the 1958 Convention, regulation
could be justified once mining became economically feasible. If mining
was to be a freedom which should be "exercised in the interests of all,"
then it necessarily "must be regulated."
Even if the first Commentaries were dispositive, there is no reason for
considering them as representing international law, or as an implicit
part of the Convention. 72 Moreover, the 1955 Commentaries refer only
to freedom to exploit the "subsoil" of the high seas, not to the "seabed."
In contrast, the 1956 report referred to the "soil and subsoil" of the con-
tinental shelf, and the Convention on the Continental shelf specifically
defined the shelf as including "the seabed and subsoil."' 73 In the 19th
century the extension of undersea mines into the high seas became an
acceptable practice. But this acceptance was based "upon the recog-
nized right of a coastal state to occupy the subsoil under the high seas by
the extension of mining installations whose entrance was located on the coastal
state or in the territorial waters thereof."' 74 Thus, whatever high seas freedom
might have existed was only in relation to mines extending from the
national territory, and did not approve direct exploitation of the seabed
beyond national jurisdiction.
When the implications of deep seabed mining are reviewed, the con-
clusion is also reached that characterizing mining as a high seas freedom
creates an internally inconsistent claim. If mining is a freedom of the
high seas the deep seabed cannot be subject to exclusive claims, but
must be openly available to all nations. 75 Yet, unilateral mining of the
M'fingandNationalLegilratin, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. J. 223, 233 (1980) [hereinafter 1956
ILC Report].
71. Id
72. See Van Dyke & Yuen,supra note 8, at 504-06. Van Dyke and Yuen conclude that the
Commentaries were the product of the efforts of one ILC member, Professor Georges Scelle,
to limit the effects of the continental shelf doctrine. He had earlier proposed "an interna-
tional administrative authority. . . to govern the exploitation of submerged areas beyond the
territorial sea" as an alternative to allowing the expanded claims over the continental shelf.
The question of mining was left open to satisfy this concern, not to ensure "high seas" access
to the oceans. In fact, if the ILC had decided to "regulate" the deep seabed, it could easily
have chosen a concept similar to the "common heritage," and not the "high seas."
73. See 1956 ILC Report, supra note 70; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Art. 1,
reprinted in FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 221 (emphasis added).
74. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 33 (emphasis added).
75. See Convention on the High Seas, Art. 2, reprinted in FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 203
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seabed would seem to presuppose exclusive claims. This argument is
made by Goldie, 76 a defender of the legality of unilateral mining. With-
out exclusivity, according to Goldie, there would be no protection from
"free riders." A free market regime is thereby ensured of "its own de-
feat."'77 As a result, he sees "the right to mine, exclusively, a reasonably
sized tract" as a necessary component of deep seabed mining.
78
To maintain that exclusive claims are not required to support high
seas mining efforts, ocean minerals would have to be available to all
nations on a first-come, first-serve basis. Resources could, then, be gath-
ered from the seabed without a claim to the ocean floor. Yet this is an
untenable position. In practice, an exclusive claim is necessary before
mining companies or investors will take the risks inherent in an ocean
mining project, 79 a fact the U.S. has recognized.80 A theoretical defense
of a legal position which does not take this reality into account rises to
the level of sophistry, and cannot be seriously considered.
This practical linkage of unilateral mining with exclusivity conforms
to a legal analysis as well. Unlike fishing, navigation, or other freedoms
of the high seas, setting up an operation over an area of the seabed to
remove minerals necessitates occupying the land itself. Rights of re-
source exploitation emanate from sovereign control over the land. The
ICJ concluded in the Aegean Sea continental shelf case that coastal states
have a right to exploit the resources of the shelf because of their sover-
eign rights over the land extensions:
[I]t is solely by virtue of the coastal State's sovereignty over the land that
rights of exploration and exploitation in the continental shelf can attach to
it, iptsojure, under international law.8 '
The same would seem to be true for the deep seabed. Thus, a state
cannot claim the right to explore the resources of a land area without
also having a right to the land. If national claims to the deep seabed
("The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of
them to its sovereignty.") See also Presidential Statement, supra note 64.
76. Goldie, A Selection of Books Reflectizg Perspectives in the Seabed Mining Debate.- Part I (Book
Review), 15 THE INT'L LAW. 293, 330 (1981).
77. Id
78. Id at 334.
79. L. HENKIN, LAW FOR THE SEA'S MINERAL RESOURCEs 25 (1968) ("Realistically, ef-
fective and economical exploitation of the resources of the deep sea would require that he
who digs have exclusive rights to explore a sizeable area of sea-bed, to follow fruitful explora-
tion with extensive mining operations, and to pursue them indefinitely, or at least for a long
term of years.").
80. Informal Working Paper IA/2 submitted by the United States at the 9th session of
UNCLOS III, under the title, "An approach to interim protection of investment," (April
1980),quotedin Biggs,supra note 70, at 253, n. 10 ("[N]one of the really major pre-production
investments. . . will be undertaken until the company concerned has a legally secured right
to a mine site. This is, of course, the traditional practice of the mining industry.").
81. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 36.
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cannot be recognized, neither can claims to the minerals.8 2
Opponents of this thesis contend in rebuttal that mining rights, by
analogy to fishing rights, can be claimed without prior stake in the
land.8 3 The fishing analogy fails to take into account that nodules are
part of the land itself. In addition, minerals are "nonrenewable on any
human time frame," and "[i]f exploited vigorously could be completely
exhausted within a few decades."'8 4 The possibility of "exhaustion" of
resources was never seriously considered during the development of fish-
ing as a high seas freedom, 5 and it is only now beginning to be ad-
dressed in the international community. 6 Other analogies used to
justify unilateral mining fail for the same reasons.8 7
Even those who maintain that mining is a high seas freedom recog-
nize limits whenever mining "unjustifiably interferes" with other uses of
the ocean.88 Since unilateral mining depletes minerals, it inherently
82. See Biggs, supra note 70, at 226 ("Exploitation is the final act of disposal exercised by
someone with absolute and exclusive rights to the corresponding land and resources. Ex-
ploitation presupposes, then, prior title to the land which is inseparable from the correspond-
ing mineral resources.").
83. See Arrow, The Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploitation of Deep Seabed Mineral Re-
sources by the United States, 21 HARV. INT'L L. J. 337, 364-65 (1980) ("Like fish, nodules may
• . .be harvested by anyone, as long as the exploitation does not unreasonably interfere with
the exercise by others of their respective freedoms of the seas.") See also T. KRONMILLER,
THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING 176 (1980).
84. Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 509-10.
85. Once the international community recognized that exploitation of the deep seabed
was feasible it began treating mining differently from fishing, by acknowledging the impor-
tance of international regulation of deep seabed mining. In contrast, a broad-based move-
ment to internationalize fishing never developed. See McRae, supra note 16, at 220. Fishing
gained general acceptance as a high seas freedom as a result of the prevailing political philos-
ophies and powers of the 17th century. There is no reason to assume it would be treated in
the same manner if it was being considered for the first time today. See Goldie, supra note 76,
at 325. Goldie uses this argument to defend the right to make exclusive claims, but the same
concept can be applied to defend application of a "common heritage" principle, especially
considering that exclusive claims are disallowed under international law.
86. See Wertenbaker, supra note 9, at 46.
87. Kronmiller also makes analogies between mining and laying submarine cables, con-
ducting marine scientific research, using the seabed for certain military purposes, dumping
wastes in the ocean (specifically radioactive wastes), and conducting gunnery and bombing
practice and large-scale naval exercises on the high seas. KRONMILLER, supra note 83, cited in
Goldie, supra note 76, at 324-6. Note that none of the cited activities involve actual exploita-
tion or exhaustion of ocean resources. Instead, the ocean space is merely used for the activity.
In addition, none of them were part of international movements to create a "common heri-
tage," although there may be some efforts to prevent use of the seabed for military purposes.
There is little that logically relates mining to these examples, given the clear international
consensus to treat mining of deep seabed minerals differently.
88. See Arrow, supra note 83. A parallel argument is that exclusive claims to the ocean
should be allowed since states are to show "reasonable regard" for other states' use of of the
ocean. See Nyhart, The Interplay of Law and Technology in Deep Seabed Mining Issues, 15 VA. J.
INT'L L. 827, 865 (1975). The basis for the "reasonable use" argument is Article 2 of the 1958
Convention on the High Seas, which specifies that freedoms of the high seas "shall be exer-
cised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas." Convention on the High Seas, Art. 2, reprinted in FRANKLIN,
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"interferes" with the rights of other nations to exploit ocean resources.
Furthermore, successfully mining the ocean floor will require long-
term projects8 9 which could significantly displace the seabed. This more
permanent occupation suggests greater rights in the ocean than is consis-
tent with a view of the seabed as being subject to freedoms of the high
seas. If nations are allowed to mine and to protect their exploitation of
the ocean, "they would thereby be endowed defacto with sovereign rights
over the high seas"9--rights that are not permitted under accepted
norms of international law.
Existing Conventions do not support a recognition of unilateral min-
ing as a high seas freedom. Additionally, mining inherently contradicts
such a freedom since it presupposes exclusive claims over the ocean bot-
tom. Because the international community-including the U.S.-has
rejected exclusive claims, 9 1 unilateral mining of ocean minerals cannot
reasonably be justified as a high seas freedom.
Necessity of a Prohibitogy Rule
A corollary to the argument that mining is specifically allowed under
existing norms is the contention that mining is permitted so long as it
has not been prohibited by definite rules of international law. The ori-
gin of this contention is the 1927 SS Lotus case in which a split court of
the Permanent Court of International Justice stated that "restrictions
upon the independence of nations cannot. . . be presumed. '9 2 The ICJ
applied a somewhat similar rationale in the 1951 Fisheres Case.9 3 Apply-
ing this dicta, proponents of the corollary argue that absent express pro-
hibitory rules seabed mining must be presumed to be lawful.9 4
Both of these cases, accepted as "good law", would have been decided
supra note 7, at 203. It is difficult to understand why a nation should feel compelled to allow
another nation to make an exclusive claim in order to show "reasonable regard." Allowing
minerals to be picked up without direct interference would seem to be the most that could be
expected. Nor can it be ignored that mining states must also show "reasonable regard,"
which may be mutually exclusive with unilateral mining.
89. Mining vehicles used for obtaining ocean nodules will be 100 feet wide, reaching to
the seabed through pipes. Companies expect to have the vehicles remain on station for five
years at a time, working around the clock and transferring minerals to auxiliary ships once
the resources are brought up. Wertenbaker, supra note 9, at 59-60.
90. [1955] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.N/SER.A/1955 (statement of Scelle,
arguing that the right to "construct installations on the continental shelf and to protect them"
allows derfacto sovereign control over the high seas to be exercised).
91. Supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
92. The S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J., SER.A, No. 10, at 19, quotedin Arrow, supra note 83, at
352.
93. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 143 [hereinafter Fisheries Case]. In the
Fisheries Case the Court relied on the fact that the act of Norway in using straight baselines
was "not contrary to international law," implying the presumptive argument.
94. See Arrow, supra note 83, at 353.
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the same way whether or not a prohibitory rule existed.95 Neither case
unequivocably recognized the principle that the law permits whatever is
not prohibited. In SS Lotus, the justices were evenly split with the pre-
siding judge casting a second vote to decide the issue.96 In the Fisheries
Case, Judge Alvarez emphasized in a concurring opinion that the pro-
hibitory rule, "though formerly correct in the days of absolute national
sovereignty, is no longer so at the present day."'9 7
The point made by Alvarez has considerable merit. The prohibitory
rule doctrine contradicts the system of international law that is exempli-
fied by the U.N. and the ICJ. Requiring a demonstration of a prohibi-
tory rule before any national action is disallowed sets up a burden of
proof requirement in international adjudications. Placing such a bur-
den on any party is inconsistent with the developing norms of conflict
resolution, and is "inimical to the settlement of international disputes by
law.'"98
Even if the doctrine is accepted, it can be demonstrated that "prohibi-
tory rules" regarding deep seabed mining do exist. It has already been
maintained that ocean resources cannot be subject to exclusive claims.
To the extent unilateral mining presupposes such claims, it is therefore
prohibited. 99 Additionally, if the "common heritage" principle is
viewed as a customary norm, it too would limit unilateral activities in
the seabed. The debate over the prohibitory rule requirement becomes
irrelevant under these conditions.
(2) The Common Heritage Prnci'ple as a Rule of Customary
International Law
The preceding sections have demonstrated that unilateral deep sea-
bed mining cannot be justified by res nullius, has not been recognized
under international law as a high seas freedom, and is not approved
simply because it is not expressly prohibited. But other than the conten-
tion that mining illegally requires exclusive sites, none of these argu-
ments explain what the law is, only what it is not.
What these arguments do reveal is that before the recent develop-
ments leading up to the UNCLOS Convention there had been no law
for deep seabed mining. In effect, the Conference was an attempt to
"create law in a vacuum."1° ° This "vacuum" has been filled by the
95. Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 520.
96. Id at 520, n. 121.
97. Fisheries Case, supra note 93, at 152 (Sep. Op. Alvarez).
98. Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 520.
99. Supra notes 81, 82 and accompanying text.
100. Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 521.
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development of the "common heritage" as a norm of international law.
If it is demonstrated that the "common heritage" has become a custom-
ary norm it will be the dispositive factor in judging the legality of unilat-
eral mining. For even if any of the defenses of unilateral mining were
once true, they would be superceded by any new principle declaring the
deep seabed to be a common heritage of humankind. The first step in
this analysis is to consider how customary international law develops.
The ICJ stated in the North Seas Continental Shelf Cases that to become
part of customary international law, state practices, "including that of
States whose interests are specially affected," must be "both extensive
and virtually uniform," while showing "a general recognition that a rule
of law or legal obligation is involved."'' Thus, in order to rise to the
stature of international law, any rule which regulates deep seabed min-
ing must be accepted as law by those nations technologically able to
exploit the ocean resources, i.e., those that are specially affected. This
acceptance may be shown by explicit affirmation, or by implicit ac-
knowledgment. As one authority has pointed out, "a state will be
bound by a customary rule if it has not adopted an attitude of persistent
opposition during the period of its formation." 0 2 Once the formation of
the rule is completed, a nation is not then permitted to retract its sup-
port. "[W]hen a custom has duly crystallized no State can be allowed to
rebut the presumption, or to contend that it does not accept what it has
allowed to come into existence without protest."' 10 3
An analysis of the growth of the "common heritage" principle demon-
strates that it meets these standards, binding all nations, including the
U.S. The principle was initially espoused in 1967 and was a motivating
factor in the Conference negotiations. In 1970 the U.N. General Assem-
bly (G.A.) unanimously adopted Declaration of Principles for the deep
seabed. 10 4 Carefully worded to gain consensus, this document pro-
claimed the deep seabed to be the "common heritage of mankind," and
stated that the seabeds could not be subject to national appropriation.
Although G.A. resolutions can only recommend actions and do not by
themselves create new law, they can significantly affect the formation of
international norms. 0 5 Specifically, when resolutions represent the gen-
eral consensus of the international community, they serve to exemplify
and strengthen customary international law.' 0 6 This would seem to be
101. North Seas Cases, supra note 57, at 43.
102. Virally, The Sources of International Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
137 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968), quoted in Biggs, supra note 70, at 240.
103. Id at 256, n. 60.
104. Declaration of Principles, supra note 59.
105. 0. LISSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY AND TOMORROW 34 (1965), quoted in
Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 525.
106. See generally Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 524-6 (discussing memorandum of
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true for the Declaration of Principles. To analyze this contention, spe-
cial attention should be focused on actions of the U.S., as the only na-
tion to explicitly reject the principle and the one most affected by it.
The U.S. was an important force behind the development of the con-
cept of the "common heritage,"10 7 and strongly endorsed it following
the Maltese proposal. 108 As early as 1968, a U.S. congressional study of
the continental shelf emphasized that there was a consensus that the
area beyond national jurisdiction "should be the subject of a presently
agreed regime or set of principles."'' 0 9 In 1970 the U.S. position was
solidified when President Nixon called for recognition of the deep sea-
bed as the "common heritage for mankind," and for the formation of an
international regime to regulate the area."10 His statement included a
specification that exclusive claims over the deep seabed should not be
allowed and that revenues from mineral production both before and
after the creation of a regime should be shared with the international
community. Subsequently, the U.S. voted in favor of the Declaration,
and thereafter continued to support its basic premises.
U.S. support was only one part of a growing worldwide movement.
Numerous national proposals submitted to the U.N. called for establish-
ment of the international regime suggested by the Declaration of Princi-
ples. A review of these proposals demonstrates that there was virtually
no disagreement over the "common heritage principle", the need for an
international regime to regulate the deep seabed, the rejection of claims
to ocean resources which were incompatible with the regime or the Dec-
laration, or requirements of equitable sharing of benefits. I " ' All of these
the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/L. 610 (1962) and statement of U.S. Representative Meeker, U.N. Doc. A/AC.
105/C.2/SR.20 at 10-11 (1963).)
107. See supra note I and accompanying text; See also bifra notes 109, 110 and accompany-
ing text.
108. The U.S. Deputy Representative to the Seabed Ad-Hoc Committee (established in
response to Ambassador Pardo's call for U.N. consideration of the oceans, supra note 2) stated
on March 20, 1968:
Yet as the great majority of States view the situation, the resources of the deep seabed
are in a real sense the legacy of mankind. Such resources should not, in their opinion, be
appropriated or exploited by those nations rich or fortunate enough to be able to operate
in the ocean depths - at least, not unless the stake of other nations in this great reservoir is
recognized.
DEPT. ST. BULL., Aug. 12, 1968, quoted in Biggs, supra note 70, at 239.
109. 1 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES 21 (Oct. 1968).
110. Statement on United States Oceans Policy, I PUB. PAPERS RICHARD NIXON 454
(May 23, 1970). John Stevenson, the Legal Advisor to the State Department under Nixon,
followed up the President's Statement with a detailed U.S. draft of a "United Nations Con-
vention on the International Seabed Area." New Directions II, supra note 59, at 753. It is
interesting to see how this compares with the UNCLOS Convention, especially considering
the negative reaction of the Reagan Administration to the treaty.
111. Alexander, supra note 2, at 122. Alexander compared the 11 proposals which had
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concepts were eventually incorporated into the UNCLOS Convention.
The unanimity of the support for the "common heritage" ideal has
created customary norms of conduct. The consensus which emerged
from the negotiations served to crystallize these norms as rules of cus-
tomary international law, with the Conference having a "constitutive or
generating legal effect." 112
The United States cannot ignore the implications of this develop-
ment. Throughout the UNCLOS negotiations the U.S. maintained its
acceptance of the "common heritage," and "committed itself" to an in-
ternational regime that "in particular would be of benefit to the devel-
oping nations."' 1 3 This position was codified through the passage of the
1980 Mining Act, which demonstrated the U.S. "committment to the
principle that deep seabed resources are part of the common heritage of
mankind."' 1 4 Although the U.S. defended mining as a high seas free-
dom, it was only in terms of interim legislation to be superseded by an
international regime. 11 5 The continuous U.S. support for the principle,
the national legislation codifying that support, and the rejection of uni-
lateral efforts to claim portions of the seabed for mining projects, 11 6
evince U.S. acquiescence to the development of the common heritage
principle as a norm of international law and its recognition of the bind-
ing nature of the norm.
It remains to be said, however, what is required under the norm of the
"common heritage." The U.S. will not accept being bound to a specific
been submitted to the U.N. Ad-Hoc Committee by January 29, 1972 from 29 nations, includ-
ing the U.S., the U.K., France, the Soviet Union, and a number of developing nations. Over-
all, he found "little variation among the proposals regarding conditions within the
international seabed area, as outlined in items 1-11 of the 1970 Declaration of Principles."
112. This same language was used by Judge Jimenez de Arechega in the Case Concerning
the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya) 1982 I.C.J. 18, 115 (Sep. Op. Jimenez de Arechega)
to defend the EEZ as a norm of customary international law: "The provisions of the negotiat-
ing texts and of the draft convention, and the consensus which emerged at the Conference,
have had . . . a constitutive or generating legal effect, serving as the focal point for and as the
authoritative guide to a consistent and uniform practice of States." Identical conclusions
apply to the "common heritage" principle, and the way it has become an accepted norm.
113. Statement by Ratiner, as Deputy Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to UNCLOS III,
to the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
of the House (March 1, 1973), quoted in Biggs, supra note 70, at 245 ("The United States has
committed itself to the proposition that the regulation and use of deep ocean mineral re-
sources should be accomplished under an international agreement which in particular would
be of benefit to the developing nations.")
114. H. REP. No. 411, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1707, 1708 (the House Ways and Means Committee referring to the Revenue Sharing
Trust Fund of the Mining Act). See also Stockwell, supra note 43 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of the 1974 claim
to a portion of the seabed by Deepseas Ventures, Inc.). By refusing to recognize any exclusive
claims to the seabed, the State Department implicitly committed itself to some sort of interna-
tional regulation of deep seabed mining. For without such exclusive claims, realistically there
could be no effective mining projects. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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treaty which it has not signed, especially considering that the princi-
ple-as is true for most norms of international law-is not precisely de-
fined." '7 Attempts to apply a moratorium on seabed mining until a
universally accepted regime is implemented have failed to gain the con-
sensus necessary to represent a customary norm.' 18 This allows the U.S.
to claim, with some legitimacy, that carefully planned national ocean
mining projects are legal. But this does not license the U.S. to avoid
responsibility for fulfilling the requirements of the common heritage in
implementing such projects.
In considering what national behavior is consistent with the principle,
three guidelines are especially important: exclusive claims to the seabed
are invalid; exploration and exploitation of the ocean resources are to be
governed by an international regime; and the resources are to be devel-
oped to benefit all nations-with equitable sharing of mining revenues.
These criteria are implicit in the principle, and have been accepted by
the U.S. and reinforced through legislation." 9 They constitute the min-
imum requirements if contemplated actions are to be deemed "legal.' 120
Being bound by the "common heritage" and these corollary guide-
lines, a nation must recognize that the international community has a
say in the disposition of the resources of the deep seabed. Thus, both the
claim that mining is a high seas freedom and the contention that nations
can unilaterally exert exclusive control over areas of the seabed are un-
acceptable. 1 2' This inconsistency has been recognized by the Reagan
117. But see Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 536 ("A Law of the Sea Convention could
have a 'constitutive' effect in that nonparties could be forced to recognize the international
legal personality of the International Seabed Authority established by the treaty.").
118. In an effort to impose a moratorium on ocean mining until an international regime
over the oceans could be established, in 1969 the General Assembly passed the "Moratorium"
resolution, officially entitled, "Question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of
the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the
limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of man-
kind." Repnrntedzn New Directions II, supra note 59, at 737. The Resolution was only passed
by a vote of 62-28 with 28 abstentions. The negative votes included a number of what would
be the "specially affected" states (i.e., those with potential ocean mining capabilities), such as
Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Soviet Union, the U.K., and the U.S.,
see Arrow, supra note 83, at 373-45, and thus it would be difficult to argue that it has acquired
the status of a generally accepted international norm. See supra note 101 and accompanying
text (discussing what is required for something to become part of customary law).
119. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
120. Most nations conclude that this "minimum" would still not be enough. In 1979 the
Trade and Development Board of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) passed a resolution which reiterated the "Moratorium" resolution, supra note
118, and concluded that unilateral ocean mining action "would be invalid according to inter-
national law." This passed by a vote of 107-9, with 13 abstentions. In general, only western
nations opposed it. See Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 8, at 498, n. 20.
121. The Deep Sea Mining Committee of the International Law Association, which in-
cluded members from the U.S. and other developed nations, made the point clearly in its
1970 Report:
That the mineral resources of the ocean floor should be developed "for the benefit of
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Administration, even in its rejection of the Convention. 122
To the extent unilateral action is desired, it must remain consistent
with the guidelines in order to fulfill the "common heritage" principle.
First, it must be recognized that nations cannot make exclusive claims to
the deep seabed. The language of the existing U.S. law meets this stan-
dard, as does the Reagan proposal, although it might be argued that
unilateral mining is nevertheless illegal since it has the effect of exclusive
claims. 123 Second, any national program would have to be "interim" in
nature, and recognize the need for an international regime to regulate
the seabed as the "common heritage" of all people. This is an explicit
purpose of the current Mining Act that is rejected in the Reagan bill.
Finally, nations must commit themselves to develop the minerals of the
seabed in a manner which will benefit all States, especially the develop-
ing nations. This can be demonstrated, in part, by sharing the revenues
of profits made through unilateral mining. The Reagan proposal would
deny this commitment while deleting the 1980 Mining Act's interna-
tional trust fund and rhetorical support for the principle.
While meeting these requirements in national legislation will allow a
nation to be in theoretical compliance with the "common heritage"
principle, in practice a nation must go beyond mere rhetoric. If a na-
tional regime is truly "interim" and an eventual international organiza-
tion is supported, the nation must demonstrate good faith in trying to
attain agreement on such an organization. Otherwise, the "common
heritage" principle would be meaningless. An obligation to conduct
mankind as a whole" [as called for in the Declaration of Principles] means a definite
rejection of the following concepts:
(i) Application of the principle of the freedom of the seas to the exploration and exploita-
tion of minerals of the ocean floor ...
(ii) Application of the "flag-state" approach which is based on the assumption that the
State whose vessels have actually undertaken the exploration and exploitation of a cer-
tain area of the ocean floor should be regarded as acquiring a right to jurisdiction and
control over the sea-bed and subsoil of that particular area.
International Law Association, Report of the Deep-Sea Mining Committee 16 (1970), reprthted
zit SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE
ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
113 (Comm. Print 1970).
122. Edwin Meese, 3d (counselor to President Reagan) wrote:
The Law of the Sea Treaty . . .asserts that the seabed's minerals are "the common
heritage of mankind," meaning that they belong collectively to all nations. While the
notion sounds noble, in practice it implies that no nation has the right to mine without
permission from the "body of the whole"-effectively repealing "freedom of the seas" as
it applies to ocean mining.
Meese, Seabed? No, Bed of ails, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1983, A17, col. 1.
Although this statement was made as an attack on the treaty, it is basically correct about
the implications of the "common heritage" principle. The Administration's antipathy toward
the principle does not alter the conclusion that the "common heritage" has become a custom-
ary norm, binding the U.S. Supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 90 and 91 and accompanying text.
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good faith negotiations is recognized as an important tenet of interna-
tional law.124 Under such an obligation, a nation is expected to "enter
into negotiations with a view of arriving at an agreement."' 2 5 Although
this standard has heretofore been applied by the ICJ only in settlement
of bilateral disputes, it seems to be applicable to a situation in which
unilateral action is expected to conform with a future international re-
gime. While the standard is not easy to apply, it generates a means for
judging national conduct with regard to ocean policy.
Conclusion
Arguments presented to support national mining-res nullius, high
seas freedom, and the absence of prohibitory rule-lack validity upon
close inspection. Thus, signing the treaty most clearly comports to stan-
dards of international law. Reagan's unilateral action, on the other
hand, unambiguously violates the standards imposed by international
norms. Through deletion of support for the "common heritage", rejec-
tion of an "interim" national program and the international trust fund,
and removal of any pressure to develop an international regime to regu-
late the seabed, the Reagan proposal exemplifies illegitimate unilateral
policy.
This analysis suggests a means for pursuing unilateral action while, at
least arguably, complying with international norms. Such a compro-
mise solution involves following the "common heritage" principle with-
out signing the Convention, as good faith negotiations continue. This
latter approach is the only means-short of signing the treaty-that is
generally consistent with international principles while also providing
possible incentives for the development of a national seabed mining
industry.
B. Effct on the US mining industry
Since the primary objection to the UNCLOS Convention relates to
the mining provisions, the policy options available to the United States
124. See North Seas Cases, supra note 57, at 47 (The obligation to negotiate "merely con-
stitutes a special application of a principle which underlies all international relations, and
which is moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations as one of the
methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.") See also Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 33 ("The task before [the parties] will be to conduct their
negotiations on the basis that each must in good faith pay reasonable regard to the legal
rights of the other.").
125. North Seas Cases, supra note 57, at 47 (Parties to a dispute are "under an obligation
so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case
when either of them insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification of
it.").
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should be evaluated according to how they may affect the domestic min-
ing industry.
(1) Signing the UNCLOS Convention
Treaty opponents maintain that signing the Convention would deter
investment in ocean mining for five reasons: (1) uncertainty in ob-
taining mining contracts; (2) required formation of a parallel mining
regime, imposing financial obligations on contractors; (3) mandatory
technology transfers; (4) limitations on mining production; and, (5) po-
tential for amendments without U.S. approval.12 6
Uncertainty in obtazinng contracts
To obtain a mining contract under the treaty a nation or private en-
tity must receive authorization from the ISA.12 7 The highly politicized
nature of the U.N. raises fears that contracts will be awarded politically
rather than on merit.
The proponents of the treaty recognize this possibility, but emphasize
existing safeguards. Under a Preparatory Investment Protection (PIP)
resolution passed in conjunction with the Convention to secure the
rights of companies that have already invested in the oceans, current
U.S. mining companies have gained guaranteed access to the seabed.
This guarantee protects access for the first generation of seabed mining,
or well into the 21st century, by which time improvements could be
126. See statement by James Malone, Special Representative to UNCLOS III for Presi-
dent Reagan, to the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Aug. 12, 1982), DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct.
1982, at 48 (outlining the Reagan Administration's objections to the UNCLOS Convention).
127. Bernard Oxman, who served as vice-chairman of the U.S. delegation to UNCLOS
III under Ford, Carter and Reagan, and as chairman of the English Language Group of the
Conference Drafting Committee, provides a summary of the contract provisions of the
Convention:
To obtain a contract conferring the exclusive right to explore and mine a particular area
with security of tenure for a fixed term of years, a company must be "sponsored" by a
state party. It must propose two mining areas, one to be awarded to the company and
the other to be "reserved" by the Seabed Authority for exploration and exploitation by
its own commercial mining company, the Enterprise, or by a developing country.
Assuming that procedural requirements are met, the Seabed Authority may refuse to
issue the contract to a qualified applicant in essentially four circumstances:
if the applicant has a poor record of compliance under a previous contract;
if the particular area has been closed to mining because of special environmental
problems;
if a single sponsoring state thereby would acquire more active mining sites, particu-
larly in the same general area, than are permissible under fairly broad geographic and
numerical limits; or
if there is already a contract or application for all or part of the same area.
Oxman, The New Law of the Sea, 69 A.B.A. J. 156, 160 (1983).
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negotiated. 28
The PIP resolution named as pioneer investors, India, France, Japan,
and the Soviet Union, as well as four multinational consortia dominated
by U.S. concerns and including investors from Belgium, Canada, the
F.R.G., Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the U.K. 129 All pioneer na-
tions except the U.S. have reserved their rights under the PIP.130 Regis-
tration will entitle a pioneer investor to:
the exclusive right to carry out exploration and testing in a registered area
of 150,000 square kilometers at the start. Once the Convention enters into
force, a qualified pioneer investor sponsored by a state party must be
granted a mining contract for that half of the original registered area se-
lected by the investor if the preparatory commission has certified compli-
ance with the conference resolution. 131
Along with the PIP, the guaranteed U.S. seat on the Executive Coun-
cil of the ISA can ensure equitable implementation of the contracting
provisions.' 32 Although treaty opponents complain that the influence of
the U.S. in the Executive Council is insufficient in comparison to the
Soviet bloc's three guaranteed seats,' 3 3 this perception is based on a mis-
understanding of the political dynamics involved. As one authority de-
scribed the process:
The Soviet bloc obtained an express guarantee of three council seats in
exchange for effectively conceding at least seven, and probably eight or
nine, to the West, including a guaranteed seat to the largest consumer,
which would be the U.S. should it become a party.' 3 4
Finally, the PrepCom could be especially effective in improving the
contracting process. It is to develop administrative procedures for the
exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals, and under its guide-
lines has an opportunity to define more precisely the procedural steps
for considering applications to mine. Qualification standards for mining
applicants are also part of the PrepCom's mandate, allowing specific
criteria for the awarding of mining contracts to be taken up. 35
128. Ratiner, supra note 6, at 24 (The seabed mining entities "are entitled to all of the
mineral production likely or possible from the seabed for the next 30 to 50 years.").
129. Spring/Summer Recent Events, supra note 24. See Van Dyke & Teichman, Transfer of
Seabed Mining Technology.: A Stumbling Block to US Ratifiation of the Law of the Sea Convention?, 13
OCEAN DEv. INT'L L. J. 427, 436 (1984).
130. See infra notes 166 and 167 and accompanying text.
131. Oxman, supra note 127, at 162.
132. See U.S. Options, supra note 22 (discussing the need for unanimity in the Council
before the PrepCom results can be modified); Address by Representative Lee H. Hamilton to
the U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 8, 1982), reprited in 62 CONG. DIG. 14, 16 (1983).
133. See statement by Northcutt Ely before the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control,
Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations (Sept. 21, 1982), repnhted in 62 CONG. DIG. 29 (1983).
134. Oxman, supra note 127, at 160.
135. U.S. Options, supra note 22, at 3.
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Through careful treatment of these issues, problems with the treaty's
contract provisions can be significantly mitigated.
Parallel mining and financi'al obligations
Under the Convention, in order to gain approval for a mining con-
tract a company must investigate and prepare plans for two mine sites,
one to be exploited by the company and the other by the Enterprise. By
taxing the revenues of the company in one site and operating in the
other, the ISA and the Enterprise allow the international community to
participate in the mining activities and to share in the profits.
Parallel mining is deemed to be patently unfair by treaty oppo-
nents. 136 The root of this opposition is philosophical, and cannot be
addressed without a fundamental change in the structure of the Con-
vention. The parallel mining system was a significant component of the
United States' compromises offered in exchange for third world conces-
sions in other areas. 137 Moreover, it is an inevitable outgrowth of the
belief that the deep seabed is a "common heritage" to be internationally
regulated. For this principle to be more than rhetoric, there must be
some means for the international community to have real access to the
oceans. This realization justifies the parallel system and revenue sharing
requirements of the Convention. Unless such provisions are incorpo-
rated into an ocean regime, only wealthy powers realistically will be
able to exploit and benefit directly from seabed minerals, and the work
of UNCLOS largely would be undone.
The financial obligations assumed by contractors under the Conven-
tion, as well as the PIP, may seem high, 38 but when considered in con-
text the demands are not unreasonable. An MIT study, relied upon by
pro-Convention negotiators, showed that a seabed mining project would
require start-up costs of three-quarter of a billion dollars, with annual
136. See Ely, supra note 133, at 31. See also address by Representative Ronald E. Paul to
the U.S. House of Representatives (April 28, 1982), reprinted in 62 CONG. DIG. 23, 25 (1983)
("The law of the sea negotiations ... is [sic] part of the larger scheme designed to create a
new international economic order. This new order consists of robbing from those who have
produced and earned their wealth and transferring it to the Marxist governments of the
Third World.").
137. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
138. The Convention and the PIP each have an application fee of $500,000. See UN-
CLOS Convention, Annex III, Art. 13(2),supra note 19; Draft Resolution Governing Prepara-
tory Investment in Pioneer Activities Relating to Polymetallic Nodules, Art. 7(a), U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.62/C.1/L.30. Under the PIP, a company must guarantee to incur expenses of at
least $1 million each year until its plan of work is approved and it begins exploitation under
the Convention. The Convention requires an annual $I million fee once a contract enters
into force, creditable against the royalties to be paid to the Authority. For a description of
the financial requirements, see Richardson, supra note 28, at 63.
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expenses of $220 million. In a period of ten years, the study predicted,
the investment could be paid back, with profits ranging from 15 -
22%,139 although recent predictions have lowered this estimate. 140 The
Convention calls for royalties of 2% in lean years and 4% in good years,
which could garner payments over a 20-year period of between $200
million and $2 billion, depending on a project's success. Yet, despite the
apparent significance of these numbers, the royalties are less than many
of those required of multinationals investing in developing nations to-
day. 41 Thus, the Convention does not make unusual or unreasonable
demands. Considering the cost of investing in the ocean, these financial
obligations are unlikely to deter investors.
Technology transfers
Coinciding with the parallel mining system is a requirement in the
Convention that for a period of ten years after the Enterprise begins
operation all mining contractors must make available for sale the min-
ing technology necessary for exploiting the seabed.' 42 This provision
was included out of the belief that without access to such technology the
international community would be unable to implement its proper
rights in the oceans.
The philosophical arguments supporting or criticizing mining rights
also apply to the transfers. While companies might prefer not to be
forced to sell technology, withholding it could potentially exclude a ma-
jority of the international community from the ocean resources. The
U.S. recognized this concern when it first proposed the transfers, along
with the parallel mining system, as a compromise with the Third
World. 143
Technology transfers are not unique to the Law of the Sea treaty but
139. Wertenbaker, supra note 9, at 62.
140. Id. at 60. An analysis by Lockheed, using estimates from the MIT study, predicted
that the rate of financial return from seabed mining projects will be 9 1/2% as opposed to the
previously anticipated 18%.
141. Id at 62.
142. Oxman, supra note 127, at 160. Oxman explains the technology transfer procedure
as follows:
Until 10 years after the Enterprise first begins production, [a mining company] must
be willing to sell to the Enterprise, on fair and reasonable commercial terms and condi-
tions determined by agreement or commercial arbitration, mining, but not processing
technology being used at the site, if equivalent technology is not available on the open
market. Alternatively, it would have the same obligation to a developing country plan-
ning to exploit the "reserved" site submitted by that company.
143. Richardson, supra note 30, at 63 ("Originally proposed by Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger in 1976 as part of the package designed to win support for the 'parallel system,'
some form of assistance to the Enterprise in acquiring technology has ever since been integral
to any seabed mining deal."). See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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have become part of the normal requests made by developing countries
when allowing investment and resource exploitation in their nation. In
general, corporations and the developed nations understand that this
"near-universal demand for technology transfer by the developing na-
tions" is "an inevitable and reasonable byproduct of investment."'144
Making such a demand in the case of ocean mineral production, there-
fore, seems perfectly natural and expected.
While the opposition to the technology transfers is emphatic,1 45 the
actual economic implications of the provisions are less important than
the public is often led to believe. Under the Convention, transfers will
be required only if the necessary information is unavailable in the open
market. U.S. Department of Interior studies have indicated that most
technology is already publicly obtainable-or will be-and thus compa-
nies will not generally be forced to sell.1 46 In addition, by creating a
ready market for mining technology, the treaty may allow companies an
opportunity to offset some of the enormous costs of ocean mineral
development. 147
If the Reagan Administration accepted the need for these provisions,
equitable implementation could be assured through the PrepCom.
These PrepCom negotiations can clarify the provisions defining technol-
ogy, specify what constitutes "fair and reasonable commercial terms and
conditions" as called for in the Convention, detail the obligations of
third-party technology suppliers, and address the implications of article
302 of the treaty, allowing for non-disclosure of information "essential"
to national security. 48 This last point is especially important, since na-
tional security concerns are a major part of the objections to technology
transfers.1 49 To adequately address these concerns, "essential" technol-
ogy could be defined to "coincide with the definition of defense-sensitive
technologies under U.S. law which are subject to U.S. export con-
trols."'1 50 On the whole, there is little to fear from the technology trans-
144. Van Dyke & Teichman, supra note 129, at 431.
145. See address by Sen. Larry Pressler to the U.S. Senate (March 8, 1982) reprinted in 62
Cong. Di. 11, 12 (1983) ("The requirement of the sharing of our mining technology is an-
other and perhaps insurmountable difficulty with the treaty.").
146. Whitaker, supra note 11, at 22.
147. Comment, The Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act and the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea. Can the Conference Meet the Mandate Embodied in the Act?, 18 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 509, 531 (1981).
148. U.S. Options, supra note 22, at 3.
149. See Pressler, supra note 145, at 11, 12 ("The fact of the matter is that once that treaty
came into effect, our military and our Pentagon and our CIA would object to a sharing of a
lot of that technology because it is related to national security. We would be entering a very
complicated and nightmarish set of international agreements that no one in this country has
really thought through carefully.").
150. U.S. Options, supra note 22, at 3.
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fer provisions.
Production hmits
The UNCLOS Convention allows the ISA to set limits on ocean min-
eral production levels if necessary to avoid major disruption of the mar-
ket of land-based producers. 15 1 Opponents of the treaty object to the
control this grants to the international organization over the private in-
vestors. Yet, such control is implicit in the common heritage.
Consideration of the needs of the developing nations in the manage-
ment of ocean resources was an important part of the United Nation's
evaluation of the seabed leading to UNCLOS 111.152 The U.S. has long
accepted the importance of this concern and initiated proposals includ-
ing production limits in its package of compromises.' 53 If the deep sea-
bed is to benefit all nations, as a common heritage, then its exploration
should be managed in such a manner as to avoid adverse consequences
for land-based markets. Until now, there has been little dispute over
this conclusion.
Realistically, the production limits, as defined in the Convention,
cause few concerns for ocean mining investors in the immediate future.
The limits are so high that they probably will not be relevant "before
the middle of the 21st century." 15 4 By that time, conditions may change
and the need for minerals could overcome the desire to avoid market
disruptions. A philosophical opposition to production restrictions
should not be the basis for rejecting the Convention.
151. Oxman, supra note 127, at 160. Oxman summarizes the production control
provisions:
Before beginning commercial production, a miner must obtain a production authori-
zation from the Seabed Authority. This must be issued so long as the aggregate author-
ized production from the international seabed area would not thereby exceed a 20-year
interim ceiling that, in the absence of an applicable commodity agreement, limits total
production of nodules to an amount that would generate by any given year no more
than the cumulative increase in world demand for nickel in the five years before the first
mine begins commercial production, plus 60% of the cumulative projected increase in
total world demand for nickel production.
152. The 9th operative paragraph of the Declaration of Principles declares:
The regime shall, inter ahia, provide for the orderly and safe development and rational
management of the area and its resources and for expanding opportunities in the use
thereof and ensure the equitable sharing by States in the benefits derived therefrom,
taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries,
whether land-locked or coastal.
Declaration of Principles, supra note 59.
153. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
154. Ratiner, supra note 6, at 24 ("Metal market projections indicate that demand for
manganese, copper, cobalt and nickel from the seabed is unlikely to reach, much less exceed,
the production capacity of these grandfathered miners during that period, nor will it exceed
the production ceiling in the treaty which could accommodate more than 20 such mine sites
in the same period.").
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The solution to the complaints raised by treaty opponents is not to
reject production limitation mechanisms, since they are an important
function of international regulation. Instead, the U.S. should work to
ensure such limits are applied fairly and economically. The PrepCom,
for example, is to draft objective and non-discriminatory standards for
the award of authorizations if selection among competing applicants be-
comes necessary under a production ceiling.' 55 As is true for the other
complaints, production limits do not justify a rejection of the
Convention.
Amendments to the Convention
The treaty provides for a "review conference" to be held 15 years af-
ter the date of the earliest commencement of commercial production.
After five years of negotiation the conference may adopt amendments to
the mining regime which will enter into force for all members upon ap-
proval of ratification of three-quarters of the party States, with no na-
tion having an explicit veto power.
The fear of treaty opponents is that this provision would allow the
potentially political ISA to take advantage of the U.S., and implement
policies which would be unacceptable. 156 Although this is one objection
which cannot be handled in the PrepCom, other factors limit its signifi-
cance. The effect of the amendment provision will not be felt for years,
allowing the U.S. to negotiate Protocols, interpretive understandings, or
proposed amendments of its own prior to the final ratification. 57 Addi-
tionally, it is unlikely that three-quarters of the other nations would im-
plement amendments opposed by the U.S. and its allies for fear of
destroying any effectiveness of the treaty. 158 Ultimately, the U.S. could
withdraw from the Convention if amendments are adopted threatening
national security. This threat, combined with effective diplomacy,
should be adequate to protect American interests. It is inconsistent for
treaty opponents to maintain that the U.S.-by rejecting the Conven-
tion-can turn its back on a decade of negotiations and near interna-
tional unanimity without cost, yet argue that if it signed the treaty the
U.S. would be forced to give in to outrageous future amendments. In
reality, a U.S. presence in the Convention would most likely deter such
provisions from ever being adopted.
155. U.S. Options, supra note 22, at 3.
156. See Malone supra note 126, at 49.
157. U.S. Options, supra note 22, at 3.
158. Whitaker, supra note 11, at 23. Citing Bernard Oxman, Whitaker writes that "radi-
cal changes would call into question the workability of the whole seabed compact, and there-
fore they are unlikely to happen."
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Overall, the complaints to the mining provisions of the Convention
have little significance in light of broader international concerns and the
ability of the PrepCom to correct nearly all the major problems. 159 To
forego the opportunity to influence the rules and regulations of the deep
seabed makes little sense,' 60 and is politically irresponsible.
(2) A Non-Treaty Option
The primary disadvantage of any policy that avoids treaty signature
is that the U.S. will forfeit the approval of the international community
and the protection offered by the Convention. In order to induce unilat-
eral seabed mining the U.S. will have to provide adequate incentives
and security for mining companies. But neither unilateral legislation
nor limited reciprocal agreements can secure a legal right to exploit a
defined area of the seabed. Without such a right, the risks are too
great. 161
While the Reagan Administration recognizes that national legislation
alone cannot sufficiently protect mining interests, 162 it believes that re-
ciprocal agreements would be an effective alternative to the Convention.
Ratiner has noted that the decision to reject the treaty "was founded on
an assumption that after the Conference ended, the Western industrial-
ized countries would ignore the law of the sea treaty and set up an alter-
nate mini-treaty."' 63  However, completion of a successful alternative
regime is unlikely.
Any alternative treaty would inevitably be challenged before the
159. See supra notes 24 and 25 and accompanying text.
160. Richardson, supra note 53, at 22 ("It is certainly not too late, in any case, to decide to
participate in the work of the Preparatory Commission that will draft the rules and regula-
tions for deep-seabed mining. . ,. [Our participation) would give us some influence over the
content of the rules and regulations. . . . [W]e would be foolish to renounce that influence.").
See Whitaker, supra note 11, at 26 ("[Piossible participants in the regime-and particularly
potential miners-ought to keep a hand in until the last 't' is crossed.").
161. Richardson, supra note 53, at 18, 20 ("Domestic U.S. law cannot give anyone a se-
cure legal right to exploit a defined area of the seabed. Without such a right good for at least
20 years, no rational investor will gamble $1.5 billion on a deep-seabed mining project. It will
not suffice for seabed-mining claims to be recognized by a handful of like-minded countries.
And even the seabed-mining states concede that international law would not require non-
members to respect the reciprocal regime.").
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs noted the same factor when reviewing the 1980
Mining Act. See H.R. REP. No. 411 (IV), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted b 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1714, 1717 ("Unless the international community recognizes the right of
U.S. firms to have assured and nondiscriminatory access to seabed mine sites, the security of
industry investments will always be in doubt.. . .The committee finds that assured access for
U.S. citizens to seabed mine sites would be best achieved if such access were universally recog-
nized in an acceptable comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty.").
162. Reagan's efforts to attract our allies to an extra-treaty regime demonstrates his recog-
nition of the need for some amount of international support. See note 46 and accompanying
text.
163. Ratiner, supra note 6, at 26.
Vol. 2:127, 1983
Law of the Sea
U.N. General Assembly and the ICJ as in conflict with the Convention.
The resulting "protracted litigation would have a chilling effect on sea-
bed mineral investment."'' 64 Therefore, according to Ratiner, "Japan,
France, Germany, Britain and most other potential seabed mining na-
tions ultimately will sign the law of the sea treaty," thereby excluding
U.S. participation in deep seabed mining. 165
States named as pioneer investors-except for the U.S.-are already
working to resolve overlapping mine site claims as called for in the PIP.
Once this is done, sites can be registered with the PrepCom. 66 Even
though the western states-other than Canada-are also maintaining
contact with the U.S. with regard to potential reciprocal agreements,
they continue to preserve their options to sign the treaty and to mine
under it once it enters into force. 167 Surveys by the U.S. Government,
including a recent report of the GAO, concluded that a "mini-treaty" to
replace the Convention will fail for lack of support.168
Because U.S. rejection of the Convention precludes international rec-
ognition of U.S. claims, companies would be discouraged from seeking
licenses under the American flag. Instead, they could reincorporate
under the auspices of a nation that has signed the treaty. Such a possi-
bility is enhanced by the fact that the main consortia investing in seabed
mining are made up of companies from more than one nation, prompt-
ing one commentator to conclude, "the concept of 'national companies'
being disadvantaged by the lack of national legislation is largely ab-
surd."' 169 As a result, "the U.S. is likely to be left without any deep
seabed mining industry."' 170
Although U.S. mining companies claim they cannot mine under the
Convention, this stance may be motivated in part by a desire to
strengthen the bargaining position of the U.S. and out of hopes a mini-
treaty will be successful. In the event alternatives are not adopted, and
the treaty remains the only source of security, companies will have over-
whelming incentive to mine under the provisions of the Convention, if
they mine at all. Extra-treaty mining would be too risky. Even a re-
gime recognizing a high seas freedom to mine would be inadequate




166. Citizens for Ocean Law, COL Update 2 (July 1983) [hereinafter July Update].
167. Spring/Summer Recent Events, supra note 24. See July Update, supra note 166.
168. Richardson, supra note 53, at 18.
169. Watt, The Law of the Sea Conference and the Deep Sea Mining Issue: The Needfor an Agree-
ment, 58 INT'L AFFAIRS 78, 83-4 (Winter 1981-2).
170. Pell, supra note 53, at 12.
171. Richardson, supra note 53, at 20. See Goldie, supra notes 77 and 78 and accompany-
ing text.
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Potentially, the U.S. could authorize financial and military support or
underwrite investments, to provide the security the U.S.-based compa-
nies would need. But companies would still be risking too much for
unilateral mining to be a sound investment. International boycotts of
minerals sold by a particular company, or other products produced by
it, might be threatened, or foreign assets could be seized in retaliation.
Or, and far more likely, the company could lose business opportunities
through lost bids to companies from signatory states. 172 These possibili-
ties will deter investment from outside the Convention regardless of the
incentives granted nationally or through reciprocal agreements.
(3) The Compromise
Objections to the mining provisions of the treaty are not without
merit and must be taken into account. Yet, the fears of treaty oppo-
nents appear to be theoretical and philosophical rather than practical.
The disadvantages of the Convention can largely be mitigated through
active U.S. participation in the PrepCom.
In addition, virtually the entire opposition to the treaty has focused
on the deep seabed mining provisions. It should be recognized that this
focus is improper. Current economic conditions have so depressed de-
mand for minerals that the development of seabed mining projects in
the near future is unlikely. Various consortia involved with deep seabed
mining investigations have begun to pull back, 173 and the demand for
the ocean minerals is much less than anticipated. 174
Throughout the UNCLOS negotiations, the seabed mining question
was of "secondary importance" to most of the delegations, even while it
was causing highly publicized disputes. 175 In general, the debate became
part of an emotional and rhetorical battle in the "North-South" dia-
logue without considerable practical implications. 176 Awareness of this
fact undermines much of the basis for treaty opposition, especially in
light of more critical concerns, such as the freedom of navigation.
The compromise solution-supporting the Convention in principle
while working toward improvements-allows continued recognition of
the need for international consensus in ocean policy. At the same time,
the possibility of gaining the necessary legal security for U.S. mining
172. Wertenbaker, supra note 9, at 65.
173. Spring/Summer Recent Events,supra note 24, at 2 ("Deepseas Ventures, Inc., which
sought in 1974 to file a claim to the international seabed with the U.S. State Department,
now forecasts commercial mining operations in the late 1900's. The Kennecott Consortium
may end efforts to mine manganese nodules altogether, and at least one Dutch company
reportedly wants to withdraw from the Lockheed consortium.").
174. Id See Wertenbaker, supra note 9, at 60.
175. Wertenbaker, supra note 9, at 59.
176. Id at 61.
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claims is enhanced. Thus, the compromise provides a more proper bal-
ance, and is the solution best protecting U.S. interests.
C. Retaliatoty Risks
The Convention is a comprehensive treaty over the sea, offering a
"package" of benefits. 17 7 By rejecting the treaty the U.S. may lose im-
portant privileges which were granted by the Third World in exchange
for "objectionable" mining provisions.
Expanding the territorial sea from 3 to up to 12 miles, the Convention
potentially places 116 international straits which are less than 24 miles
wide within national jurisdiction. These straits include virtually all of
those strategically significant to the U.S.178 Parties to the Convention
are granted rights of "transit passage" through the straits, allowing free
movement of submerged submarines and overflight, and assuring unim-
peded navigation.1 79 But non-parties are not guaranteed such passage
rights. "Transit passage" was negotiated into the treaty as part of a
series of trade-offs, and cannot be considered separate from the "pack-
age deal." Thus, most nations do not recognize transit passage as part of
customary international law, and non-signatories could lose the
protections. 180
The Reagan Administration maintains that the rules of customary
international law allow U.S. passage through the straits and guarantee
protection in other areas. Most developing nations disagree, as do many
of our allies. All of the European delegates at a July, 1983, NATO
meeting on the Convention "expressed real doubts that the U.S.-as a
non-signatory-could rely on customary law." 18' In a speech before the
177. Id. at 52. See Richardson, supra note 53, at 20; Whitaker, supra note 11, at 24.
178. Pell, Introduction to Special Law of the Sea Issue, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 387, 391 (1981).
Examples of strategically important straits of less than 24 miles in width are: the Strait of
Gibraltar, separating the Atlantic Ocean from the Mediterranean Sea; the Strait of Hormuz,
in the Persian Gulf; and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, linking the Pacific and Indian
Oceans.
179. Whitaker, supra note 11, at 18. There is some dispute over whether the Convention
goes far enough in protecting navigation rights, especially with reference to the submerged
passage of submarines through international straits. Compare Reisman, The Regime of Straits
and International Security." An Appraisal of International Lawmaking, 74 AM. J. INT'L 48 (1980)
(arguing that the Convention is too ambiguous, providing insufficient recognition of the im-
portance of submerged passage of submarines) with Moore, The Regime of Srails and the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1980) (maintaining that,
in context, the Convention is adequate to protect submerged passage of submarines). The
two authors agree on the importance of unhindered navigation rights through straits. Even if
Reisman's assessment is correct, and the Convention is not specific enough, it will still provide
much more security for parties than for non-parties.
180. Whitaker, supra note 11, at 24, 26. See Richardson, supra note 53, at 20 ("We suc-
ceeded in persuading other countries to address our navigational concerns only by agreeing to
address their resource interests. It was therefore understood from the outset that the objec-
tives of UNCLOS III was a 'package deal'. Exactly that was accomplished on April 30.").
181. Id. at 24. This view coincides with that of the developing nations. During the first
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U.N., Alan Beesley, head of the Canadian delegation, warned that the
new navigation rights provided in the Convention would have to be re-
garded as subject to the law of treaties rather than customary norms.1 8 2
Although the Convention preserves the freedom of navigation and
overflight, "[w]ithout UNCLOS III, the United States would have great
difficulty maintaining these freedoms and rights in the face of emerging
customary law trends toward restricting navigation within the ex-
panding zones of coastal nation jurisdictions."' 8 3 Since most nations
should become parties to the Convention, broad national claims will be
limited, but this does not protect the U.S. from retaliation as a non-
party. At best, "the results will be uncertain, time consuming, and the
diplomatic costs potentially high."' 1 84
While the U.S. may be able to bilaterally or multilaterally protect its
interests from outside the Convention, the difficulty-as well as the
cost-will be greatly increased. States controlling important straits,
such as Spain and Indonesia, could use U.S. non-participation in the
Convention "as a pretext for exacting a higher price during negotiations
for, say, base rights, reciprocal taxation, or consular agreements."' t8 5 As
a result, "U.S. commercial ships might be forced to pay large tolls to
navigate other states' coastal waters."'18 6 One source has estimated that
the political, economic and military costs of negotiating "a number of
satisfactory agreements would far outstrip the costs and concessions in-
volved in the UNCLOS III agreement."'1 8 7
Military priorties could be especially vulnerable to exploitation. In
certain military supply actions, such as resupply missions to Israel, poli-
tics could force the U.S. to yield to virtual extortion, with the costs easily
exceeding the value of deep seabed minerals. 188 And the need to protect
submerged passage of submarines, a vital part of our nuclear deter-
session of the PrepCom, the Group of 77 issued a response to Reagan's Proclamation, stressing
"its firm opposition to any action by States which have not signed the Convention to apply
selectively, whether unilaterally or jointly, the provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, while continuing to reject the provisions relating to the international seabed area."
Spring/Summer Recent Events, supra note 24, at 1. But see MacRae, supra note 16, at 221.
MacRae defends the Convention as representative of international law-especially where it
prohibits unilateral ocean mining. But he warns that if nations argue that the Convention is
merely a contractual relation, and hence that the U.S. cannot be protected by the navigation
provisions, they may inadvertently "legitimize the United States' refusal to sign."
182. Id
183. Jacobson, supra note 14, at 851.
184. Pell, supra note 178, at 391.
185. Whitaker, supra note 11, at 26.
186. Id.
187. Statement of Lee Kimball, for the United States Church Law of the Sea Project,
before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environ-
ment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Sept. 30, 1981), reprinted in 62 CONG.
DIG. 28, 30 (1983).
188. Whitaker, supra note 11, at 26.
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rent, 18 9 could place the U.S. in a very difficult bargaining position.
Additional problems could occur with regard to agreements in the
Convention governing marine scientific research, management of
fisheries, protection of the marine environment, or limitations on inter-
ference with shipping to protect a coastal state's environment. 190 By
losing out on the "package deal," the U.S. might also forfeit the benefits
many of these provisions could provide.
The more directly the U.S. opposes the treaty and the "common heri-
tage" principle, the greater the risks of retaliation it incurs. Unlike the
1980 Mining Act, the Stevens/Breaux bill contains few mitigating fac-
tors to defuse opposition to U.S. actions. 19 1 With the Convention now
completed, and the U.S. withdrawn from participation, there is no rea-
son for other nations to seek further U.S. support or concessions. The
bill also makes no effort to hide the rejection of the principles behind the
treaty, and thus does not reveal itself to be a "reasonable measure.192
Therefore, the incentives are there for retaliation against the U.S. The
threat of retaliation against non-signatories adds to the pressure on U.S.
allies to ignore the Reagan position, and to join the Convention. 93 In
such a scenario, the U.S. will become even more isolated and vulnerable
to exploitation.
D. Long-Term Strategic Concerns
Treaty opponents charge that signing the Convention would threaten
189. See Reisman, supra note 179; Moore, supra note 179.
190. Whitaker, supra note 11, at 24.
191. Caron, Municipal Legislation for Exploitation of the Deep Seabed, 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L. J. 259, 285 (1980) (discusses the 1980 Mining Act, and concludes that significant mitigat-
ing factors existed to minimize adverse reactions, including that: "the bill will not authorize
actual commercial recovery for several years, thereby preempting confrontation"; "the desire
of many nations to reach a successful conclusion to UNCLOS III will limit the strength of the
opposition"; and "close scrutiny of the Act reveals it overall to be a reasonable measure,
grounded in existing principles of international law, committed to protection of the marine
environment and conservation of resources, and providing recognition, in both a legal and afinancial
sense, of the status of deep seabed minerals as the common heritage of mankind. "(emphasis added)) In
general, the factors noted by Caron are not present in the Stevens/Breaux bill to mitigate
opposition.
192. Id.
193. Watt explains the significance limitations on navigation rights could have on the
western powers:
These developments [of the expanded territorial seas] have meant the virtual disap-
pearance of vital sectors of the world's normal high-sea routes into the jurisdiction of
single states. The continuance of the principle of freedom of navigation (and overflight)
is essential to the major sea-using powers both for military and commercial shipping
purposes. It is essential for the deployment of their naval fouces, and for the free trans-
port of oil and goods. And it is nowhere more important than to the NATO powers for
whom the Atlantic and the Mediterranean represent their internal lines of communica-
tion, and who draw most of their energy supplies in tanker-carried crude oil from the
Gulf.
Watt, supra note 169, at 80.
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national sovereignty by subjecting the U.S. to political pressure from the
ISA. 194 Such fears are unfounded. If actions are proposed that would
seriously endanger the U.S., it ultimately has the option of pulling out,
possibly joined by many of its allies. The threat of a withdrawal in and
of itself could minimize the possibility or effectiveness of ISA political
pressure. Moreover, as a positive response, the U.S. could apply its dip-
lomatic influence to deter such actions.
U.S. influence would be greater as a member than as an outsider.
The effectiveness of U.S. leverage against Third World efforts to impose
an international monopoly through the Convention would depend on
how well the U.S. could work with its co-signatory allies. If all the ma-
jor seabed miners cooperated, they could resist unreasonable propos-
als. 195 If the U.S. rejects the treaty, however, and becomes isolated in
ocean policy, it would not have the means to elicit cooperation.
While the U.S. would risk little diminution in its power and influence
by becoming a party to the treaty, it loses substantial credibility by re-
fusing to sign. The Convention is a major element in the development
of the New International Economic Order, seen by the developing na-
tions as the way to overcome the economic and financial barriers that
confront them. 19 6 Repudiation of the treaty and the "common heri-
tage" is perceived by many as another example of 19th century colonial-
ism. 19 7  Thus, U.S. influence in future "global dialogue[s]" will
diminish, 9 8 and its denunciation of international law violations by the
Soviet Union or other significant actors in world politics will be viewed
with greater suspicion by the world community. 199
If the Convention succeeds without U.S. support, the American posi-
tion and future credibility would be even more severely damaged. The
developing nations would see that the U.S. is not needed for significant
advances to be made. In such a situation, Ratiner claims, the U.S.
would "suffer a much more serious adverse precedent that any of the
adverse precedents we fought against in the treaty negotiation it-
self. . . . We will stand as the emperor without clothes .... .200
U.S. opposition to the treaty harms the stature of international law
and world order. The Convention stands as a "model for other large
194. See, e.g., Pressler, supra note 145, at 17; Address by Sen. Donald Young before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (June 17, 1982), reprinted in 62 CONG. DIG. 21 (1983).
195. Whitaker, supra note 9, at 23 ("In the future, as now, U.S. leverage will depend on
how cohesively this county works with its allies. If a Third World cabal tries to impose an
international monopoly [through the Convention] several decades hence, the U.S. and the
other seabed miners can resist if they work together.").
196. Watt supra note 169, at 85.
197. See Wertenbaker, supra note 9, at 61.
198. Richardson, supra note 53, at 22.
199. See Whitaker, supra note 11, 26.
200. Ratiner, supra note 6, at 28.
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assemblages of countries seeking to deal with complex problems."'20 '
The Convention also demonstrates the ability of nations to accept re-
straints on their freedom in the interest of promoting world order. By
establishing a "hierarchy of new international courts to rule on dis-
putes" and various other mechanisms for settling problems, the Conven-
tion holds out hopes for peaceful international dispute resolution. 20
2
Whether or not the treaty succeeds without U.S. participation, Ameri-
can opposition to the Convention could limit the treaty's impact on the
development of international law, to the detriment of all nations. As the
Chairman of the First Committee of UNCLOS III said, "it is through
international law universally recognized that each one of our nations
may hope to survive. '20 3
IV Conclusions and Recommendations
The completion of the UNCLOS Convention was a major event in
the history of international relations,20 4 and represents "a victory for the
principles of peaceful cooperation and the rule of law." °20 5 Given the
significance of the treaty, the U.S. should reconsider its refusal to sign,
and its opposition to the Convention principles.
Future U.S. ocean policy can take a number of forms. This Note has
evaluated three available policy options by reviewing their international
legality, the effect on the domestic ocean mining industry, the potential
for prompting retaliation by other nations and the consequences on the
long-term credibility of the U.S. in global dialogues.
Based on this analysis, this Note has concluded that, to be legitimate,
ocean mining efforts must be consistent with the "common heritage"
principle-a generally accepted norm of customary international law.
If the U.S. denies this principle through implementation of a unilateral
mining program, it risks the loss of any domestic ocean mining industry.
At the same time, as a non-signatory the U.S. would be forced to pay a
high premium for guaranteed access to important areas of the world and
it would lose the benefit of a number of important provisions in the
Convention "package." These retaliatory effects could far exceed the
cost of any hoped for benefits of ocean mining. The U.S. would also
201. Wertenbaker, supra note 9, at 39.
202. Id See Oxman, supra note 127, at 162.
203. Report of the Chairman of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.91
(March 29, 1982), at 11.
204. Canada's Alan Beasley, chairman of the Convention's drafting committee, called the
treaty "the most significant achievement in international relations since the U.N. Charter. It
is indeed a constitution for the seas." Johnson, A Constitutionfor the Seas, TIME, Sept. 8, 1980,
at 42.
205. Richardson, supra note 8, at 3.
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diminish its ability to adapt to the long-term needs of an increasingly
interdependent world, while weakening the development of interna-
tional law.
The Reagan Administration has failed to appreciate the effects of its
policy on the law of the sea because of its ideologically rigid philosophy.
Rather than attempting to negotiate improvements in the treaty before
passage, or continuing to work to correct imperfections through the
PrepCom negotiations, the Administration has remained unalterably
committed to a free market regime over the oceans-an option unac-
ceptable to the international community. Too much is at stake to allow
such ideological rigidity to continue to dictate U.S. foreign policy.
A superior ocean strategy, and one which can balance the desire to
improve the terms of the Convention with the vital need for interna-
tional consensus on ocean policy, is for the U.S. to rely on a flexible
approach. Adopting the provisions of the Convention which are not ob-
jectionable, while continuing to stay involved in the UNCLOS process,
allows the U.S. to best protect its national interests.
To implement this strategy, the Stevens/Breaux bill should be re-
placed or significantly amended. The following outline provides the
framework for more appropriate legislation.
1. Adopt a 200-mile EEZ and other provisions of the Convention
which are not disputed.
2. Acknowledge the importance of an international regime over the
oceans, and the legitimacy of the "common heritage" principle.
3. Call for renewed efforts to negotiate an acceptable international
regime under U.N. auspices, and encourage U.S. participation in the
PrepCom.
4. Implement an "interim" unilateral program consistent with an
eventual international regime and the "common heritage" principle.
Accepting the premises behind these recommendations is crucial if the
U.S. is to develop an ocean policy which suits the political realities of
our time. Negotiating a comprehensive treaty covering three-quarters of
the world's surface is a vital step for international law and security. To
reject that opportunity due to an ill-advised and ideologically rigid phi-
losophy is to deny our moral, political, and legal responsibilities.
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